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Abstract
Ambiguity affects decisions of people who exhibit a distaste of and require a
premium for dealing with it. Do ambiguity-neutral subjects completely disregard
ambiguity and react to any vague news? Online vending platforms often attempt
to affect buyer’s decisions by messages like ‘‘20 people are looking at this item
right now’’ or ‘‘The average score based on 567 reviews is 7.9/10’’. We augment
the two-color Ellsberg experiment with similarly worded signals about the
unknown probability of success. All decision-makers, including ambiguity-neutral,
recognize and account for ambiguity; ambiguity-neutral subjects are less likely to
respond to vague signals. The difference between decisions of ambiguity-neutral
and non-neutral subjects vanishes for high precision signals; still less than 60%
subjects choose the ambiguous urn, even for high communicated probabilities of
success. We conjecture participants may discard information, if they see no
contradiction between it and their prior beliefs, hence the latter are not updated.
Higher confidence makes subjects more likely to discard the news, and empiri-
cally ambiguity-neutral subjects appear more confident than those ambiguity-
averse.
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1 Introduction
News affects behavior of individuals, organizations, and whole markets even if the
conveyed message lacks precision.1 A special type of imprecise news can be seen in
on-screen notifications common in online stores and booking platforms: ‘‘Booked 4
times on your dates in the last 6 h on our site. Last booked for your dates 26 min
ago.’’ (booking.com), ‘‘In high demand: 28 booked in the last day’’ (rentalcars.com),
‘‘Customer reviews: 4.1 out of 5; total 4354 customer ratings’’ (amazon.co.uk), etc.
We place messages of this type in the context of decisions in uncertainty and
experimentally show that ambiguity attitudes explain reaction to them. Ambiguity-
neutral subjects are less likely to change choices in response to vague news,
implying that somehow vagueness matters for them despite neutrality to ambiguity;
they also disregard messages that communicate very high probabilities of success. A
possible explanation is in the lack of updating of prior beliefs by subjects with high
confidence, which appears to correlate with ambiguity-neutrality.
Models of decisions in uncertainty agree that when ambiguity is resolved,
decisions of non-neutral to ambiguity subjects become indistinguishable from those
of ambiguity neutrals. Empirically, for example, Baillon et al. (2017) show, using
real data, that as soon as more information about the dynamics of stock option
performance becomes available, ambiguity-averse subjects form beliefs close to
those of their ambiguity-neutral peers. It is not clear though, if ambiguity-neutral
subjects fully incorporate all incoming information in their decision; in our data, for
example, a significant fraction of ambiguity-neutral subjects respond to positive
news but this fraction is nowhere close to 100 per cent (see Fig. 1). Theoretical
models offer qualitatively different predictions in this regard. In the multiple-priors
framework (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), a signal (communication of information)
affects decisions of ambiguity-averse subjects only if it alters the lowest expected
utility. Therefore, a vague signal that changes the set of priors but leaves the worst
expectation unchanged might lead to a change in choices of ambiguity-neutral
subjects (if their belief is affected) but no change in the ambiguity-averse behavior.
In the second-order models (e.g. Klibanoff et al. 2005; Nau 2006; Neilson 2010)
response of ambiguity-averse subjects depends on how exactly signals affect the
whole second-order distribution; theoretically, they can both underreact and
overreact to news compared to the response of ambiguity-neutrals. Neo-additive
capacities (Chateauneuf et al. 2007) explicitly weigh the probabilistic and the non-
probabilistic components of the decision functional. As long as the worst and the
1 Qualitative corporate news (lacking numbers and hard evidence) stimulates trading activity of short
sellers (von Beschwitz et al., 2017) and drives stock prices even if it bears little factual information (von
Beschwitz et al., 2015; Boudoukh et al., 2013). Service quality signals of various precision and reliability,
available through online reviews and ranking systems, influence consumer choices (Vermeulen and
Seegers, 2009). Players’ decisions in game shows are sensitive to moderators’ comments even if those are
ambiguous. For example, Eichberger and Vinogradov (2015) discuss lowest-unmatched bid auctions
where a player wins if his/her bid is unmatched (no other player places such a bid), and is the lowest
among all unmatched bids. In their data, the bidding pattern sharply changes when the moderator
announces the winning bid is ‘‘below €20’’ or ‘‘below €300’’, although in both cases the winning bid
(unknown to players) was just under €15, and 80% of participants anyway placed bids under €20 before
the announcements. This fraction fell by some 30% after the second announcement.
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best outcomes remain unaffected, the neo-additive approach implies a higher impact
of news that communicate a probability value on probabilistically sophisticated
subjects, as the latter assign a weight of unity to the probabilistic component.
Importantly, the above (and other) theoretical models assume homogeneity of
ambiguity-neutral subjects in terms of their dealing with ambiguity, which appears
in conflict with our data.
The fact that ambiguity-neutral subjects by definition neither like nor dislike
ambiguity, does not have to imply they neglect it. When subjects receive
information, they first evaluate it, before making the decision. The information is
tested against a prior belief (the probability of success in the ambiguous urn)
subjects have: if there is no contradiction between the prior and the data, the prior
stands; if the data contradict the prior, the latter is updated to fit the data.2 This
belief then informs decision-making. Subjects who are more confident in their prior
are less likely to update beliefs in response to new information. Literature (e.g.
Dominiak et al. 2012) and our observations suggest these are more likely to be
Fig. 1 Fractions (y-axis) of ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-neutral subjects choosing the urn with an
unknown composition (a) in Ellsberg-type two-color experiments. ‘‘Ellsberg (color)’’, where color = red
or blue, depict choices in treatments without signals: ‘‘If a [color] ball is drawn you will get the prize.
Would you prefer to draw the ball from Urn A or Urn B?’’ Further questions are conditioned on
color = red and include signals (formulated on the x-axis) about choices and draws of hypothetical other
participants. Subjects are classified as ambiguity-averse if in the standard Ellsberg experiment they prefer
the unambiguous urn independent of the color on which the prize is conditioned; subjects who choose
different urns in the two Ellsberg questions are classified as ambiguity-neutral. The total number of
ambiguity-neutral (AN) subjects is 204 and ambiguity-averse (AA) is 1035. Number of ambiguity-averse
subjects choosing urn A in ‘‘Ellsberg (Red)’’ and ‘‘Ellsberg (Blue)’’ is zero by definition
2 There is a large literature on updating ambiguous beliefs, starting from Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1993)
axiomatization of maximum-likelihood updating (see, e.g. Eichberger et al. 2007 and 2010, for a brief
review and characterization of approaches). However theoretical approaches typically derive updated
preferences conditional on a realization of an event, which may have a clear interpretation as a color of a
ball drawn in the Ellsberg experiment (e.g. in Cohen et al., 2000) but are not that straightforwardly linked
to signals in our study.
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ambiguity-neutral; thus they effectively take ambiguity of news into account by
discarding the news. This approach is similar to ideas used in Ulrich (2013), where
investors receive signals (observe inflation data) and apply a likelihood ratio test to
identify if their reference model is trustworthy, and in Fryer et al. (2019) where
agents receive an imprecise (open to interpretation) signal, which is first interpreted
and then used to form beliefs. In our case the signal is interpreted from the
perspective of whether it confirms the prior belief or not.
As highlighted in Fig. 1, we extend a standard two-color Ellsberg (1961)
experiment by adding signals about the probability of success in the ambiguous urn
and investigate how subjects with different ambiguity attitudes respond to variations
in ambiguity, in the communicated probability of success, and in both. A number of
studies have previously analyzed the impact of varying levels of ambiguity on
decisions. Early studies by Curley and Yates (1985) and Bowen et al. (1994)
represented ambiguity as an interval of possible values of probability and varied
both the length and the centerpiece of this interval with an objective to detect
changes in the average ambiguity attitude of the sample. Budescu et al. (2002) and
Du and Budescu (2005) use the same approach, yet focus on subjects’ sensitivity to
gain/losses framing, as well as to the domain of uncertainty (outcomes or
probabilities).3 Another approach to vary ambiguity is used by Ahmed and Skogh
(2006) who make subjects’ payoffs dependent on a draw from an urn, the
composition of which is either unknown, or described in a way that limits but does
not fully reveal the likelihood of success, or described well enough to give a precise
probability of it. In their data, when ambiguity is high, subjects prefer to share
losses, but as ambiguity reduces, subjects switch towards insurance. However, no
distinction between ambiguity-neutral or ambiguity-averse subjects makes it
difficult to judge to which extent subjects’ decisions are governed by ambiguity
attitudes.4 Our focus is on differences between ambiguity-neutral and non-neutral
subjects, and in particular on the way signals about the likelihood of success and the
ambiguity of those signals affect decisions.
To signal probabilities in ambiguity, we imitate messages of online stores and
booking websites who often tempt buyers with messages like ‘‘5 people are looking
at this item at the moment’’, ‘‘This hotel was booked 13 times on our site’’ or ‘‘Score
based on 527 reviews: 7.9/10’’. These messages may be ordered according to their
information strength: the first one tells us about other people making a decision but
3 As a variation of this approach, Kramer and Budescu (2005) make both urns in the Ellsberg task
ambiguous, yet with different degrees of ambiguity: for better [imprecise] probabilities of success, they
found less ambiguity avoidance, although when subjects choose between urns with imprecise and precise
probability, ambiguity avoidance increases in the likelihood of success. The mechanics of this behavior is
unclear.
4 They attribute this change in behavior to the inability of participants to calculate a fair insurance
premium when probabilities are not given. Equally, one could argue, if subjects form beliefs as in Chew
and Sagi (2006, 2008) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011), insurance premiums can be calculated, yet they would
be different on the demand and supply sides due to different effects of ambiguity aversion. No insurance
may thus be an equilibrium outcome, similarly to no trading in Dow and Werlang (1992) or no deposits in
the banking equilibrium in Vinogradov (2012). Other approaches to varying ambiguity include, e.g.,
presenting subjects with multiple sources (Eichberger et al. 2015) or varying the number of colors in the
urn (Dimmock et al. 2016b).
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not the decisions or their outcomes; the second one reports on some decisions
previously made but ignores the outcomes. The third message is the most
informative out of the three, reporting the average outcome and its reliability (the
number of ‘‘trials’’). We use this idea to compose signals in our experiments. For
example, we tell our subjects that 12 [hypothetical] participants before them chose
the ambiguous urn in the Ellsberg task, or 12 out of 20 actually drew a red ball from
that urn. As messages of this type are common in everyday life, they are easy to
understand. From a statistical perspective, they may be conveniently interpreted as a
frequentist representation of probability or as reports on the number of successes in
Bernoulli trials. Subjects make decisions sequentially, starting with the standard
Ellsberg task, which is used to distinguish between ambiguity-averse, -neutral, and –
seeking participants. They further progress through signals akin to those described
above. We collect data from five independent experiments, both lab-based and
online, with and without monetary incentives, with the number of participants
ranging from 109 to 892, giving us a total of 1182 valid responses5 of ambiguity-
averse and ambiguity-neutral subjects. The large total number of responses is
crucial as ambiguity-neutral subjects are a key benchmark in our approach, and
usually their fraction in experiments on ambiguity attitudes is not large; online
experiments offer a good opportunity to collect large samples. We then conduct a
difference in means analysis, complemented with probit regressions controlling for
gender, age and knowledge of statistics, to establish the effects of signals on
decisions.
On the one hand, providing some information, however vague, potentially
reduces ambiguity, for which reason we expect a positive impact on ambiguity-
averse subjects. Indeed, in all tasks we detect a significant effect of signals on
subjects’ choices; ambiguity-averse subjects are likely to react even to very vague
news bearing little information about the probability of success, see Fig. 1 for a
preview of our results. On the other hand, vague news lacks reliability, for which
reason a vague signal may be not strong enough to reject prior beliefs about the
fundamentals, thus implying limited effect through the change in fundamentals
(probability of success) channel. Theoretically, ambiguity-neutral subjects only
respond to changes in fundamentals. In our data, a large part of them remain
unaffected by the news, although the communicated probability of success is
evidently above 0.5, as there is also a significant fraction of those who change
decisions. This highlights the heterogeneity in the ambiguity-neutral cohort, which
we attribute to confidence. The difference between ambiguity-averse and ambigu-
ity-neutral subjects in their responses to signals becomes less significant once they
face signals that convey some probability of success; subjects with a better
knowledge of mathematical statistics and probabilities are more likely to respond to
them. The strongest response is observed for the signal that communicates the
highest likelihood of success. Varying the precision of the signal also produces a
5 Valid responses are complete and non-duplicate, a filter used in online versions of our experiment. A
response is complete if the subject has made choice in all tasks that are presented sequentially. Subjects
who quit the online system before completing all tasks are deemed having low intrinsic motivation and
excluded from the analysis (Vinogradov and Shadrina 2013). Response is non-duplicate if it comes from a
unique IP address – this helps ensure all subjects are unique and none took part twice.
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significant effect on subjects’ choices. All main results hold at the aggregate level
for the pooled data, controlling for experiments, at the split level for the subsamples
of lab versus online, and incentivized versus unincentivized experiments, and at the
level of individual experiments, to ensure consistency of findings across them.
2 Methodology and data
Our data comes from both online and lab experiments. Jumping ahead, main results
are identical across all independent online experiments reported in this paper, which
adds validity to the online design. As a comparison benchmark, lab experiments
confirm online findings. There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the validity
and generalizability of results from lab experiments (e.g. Rubinstein 2001 and 2013,
Levitt and List 2007, Falk and Heckman 2009—to mention a few). Appendix A
discusses pros and cons of online versus lab experimental settings (see, e.g. Reips,
2000, and Birnbaum, 2004, for an overview). The main reason for us to go online is
the data on ambiguity-neutrality: we need a large enough sample to ensure the
cohort of ambiguity-neutral subjects is of a reasonable size. As on average about
60% of subjects are found ambiguity-averse, with some studies reporting as many as
above 70% (see Oechssler and Roomets 2015), and the Ellsberg test can falsely
classify ambiguity-neutral subjects as ambiguity-averse or -seeking, in a worst case
scenario we can be left with about 10–15% of subjects deemed ambiguity-neutral.
In a typical lab session this could mean as little as 3–5 participants in a cohort. To
overcome this problem, lab results in our paper are based on several sessions. An
online experiment is a rather inexpensive alternative to obtain the required large
number of responses. Another issue is the payment scheme, which often becomes a
point of critique. For robustness, we conducted several experiments with different
payment schemes as well as without monetary incentives—results are qualitatively
the same. Consistency of results across individual experiments is reported in
Sect. ‘‘Individual experiments’’.
2.1 Questionnaire and variables
Subjects answer a questionnaire consisting of four parts, see Appendix B. In part I,
they face the standard Ellsberg task and report whether they would bet on urn A
(ambiguous) or B (risky) if they need to pick a red (in question Q1) or a blue6 (in
question Q2) ball in order to win. This task is used as a simple test of ambiguity
attitudes. For the major part of the analysis our focus is on ambiguity-aversion and
ambiguity-neutrality. We will code subject i’s ambiguity aversion as a binary
variable AAi, which takes a value of 1 if the subject is classified as ambiguity-
averse, and 0 if the subject is ambiguity-neutral according to this test. Neither
ambiguity-averse nor ambiguity-seeking subjects can be falsely classified as
ambiguity-neutral, yet some ambiguity-neutral subjects may be falsely classified as
ambiguity-averse. For this reason, any potential differences between cohorts with
6 In some experiments we used black color instead of blue.
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AAi ¼ 1 and AAi ¼ 0 are conservative estimates which would only become more
pronounced if truly ambiguity-neutral subjects are removed from the cohort with
AAi ¼ 1.
In Part II subjects are told the prize in all subsequent tasks is conditioned on
drawing Red, as in Q1. Each question contains a signal that refers to choices and
draws of hypothetical ‘‘other participants’’. The wording ‘‘other participants’’ was
inspired by messages like ‘‘Five other users are looking at this hotel at the moment’’,
common on booking websites. For online participants, questions and ‘‘other
participants’’ are hypothetical by the design of the survey. Although the word
‘‘hypothetical’’ does not appear in the questions, numbers were chosen so that
subjects do not associate questions with the real participants in the lab. To avoid
deception, in the lab sessions an effort was made to explain in the introduction that
questions were hypothetical and outcomes would be computer-modelled. It was also
made clear that hypothetical balls are returned to the urns after each draw. In an
informal post-experiment feedback, both in the lab and online7 participants
confirmed no confusion arose in this regard. We use different incentive schemes in
different settings, to ensure results are not driven by a potential misunderstanding of
the question or incentives.
In Q3 subjects learn that 12 ‘‘other participants’’ chose the ambiguous urn (A),
while in Q4 they learn that 12 out of 20 participants did so. Neither signal explicitly
communicates anything about the distribution of balls in urn A, yet subjects may
perceive them as such. Responses of ambiguity-neutral subjects serve as a litmus
test for the probabilistic component of signals. Question Q5 communicates that 12
out of 20 ‘‘other participants’’ drew a red ball from the ambiguous urn. This signal is
designed to indicate the likely distribution of balls in urn A without removing
ambiguity completely. Questions Q6 and Q7 differ from Q5 in either the
communicated frequency of drawing Red from A (16/20 participants instead of
12/20) or the number of total observations on the basis of which this frequency was
calculated (120/200 participants drew Red from A instead of 12/20). We associate
these signals with a better probability of success in A (16/20[ 12/20), and a further
reduction in ambiguity (increase in precision of the signal) respectively. All
numbers are chosen with the intention to simplify calculations subjects might wish
to perform.
In Part IV, participants are asked to rate their proficiency in statistics and
probabilities, indicate their age and gender. Along with revealed confidence,
answers to these demographic questions serve as control variables. Variable STATS
captures subjects’ proficiency in statistics: STATS ¼ 1 for subjects who assess their
knowledge of statistics and probabilities higher than 3, the median, at the five-point
scale used in question Q10. FEMALE takes value 1 for female subjects and 0 for
males, as reported in answers to question Q11.
YOUNG distinguishes between younger (age reported in question Q12 is below
25, YOUNG ¼ 1) and older (YOUNG ¼ 0) cohorts of subjects. This split is dictated
7 In the pilot experiment, not reported in this paper, participants were recruited via a Facebook account,
and the feedback was collected via Facebook, too. This does not violate anonymity of participants as their
comments on Facebook cannot be linked to their answers in the experiment. In other online experiments,
participants had an option to leave feedback in the end of the experiment.
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by the distribution of observations in the age groups and is conveniently consistent
with the definition of ‘‘youth’’ by the UN.8
Table 1 describes data from all five experiments. For comparison, Oechssler and
Roomets (2015) summarize percentages of subjects that can be classified as
ambiguity averse from 39 experimental studies: if extremes are omitted, on average
57.1% subjects are found ambiguity-averse, with the percentage ranging predom-
inantly between 45 and 75%. Our observations lie comfortably within these limits.
2.2 Recruitment and incentives
For the lab experiments, subjects are recruited on campus, representing a mix of
students and staff. Experiment Lab1 took place at the Higher School of Economics
in Perm (Russia), with recruitment through a newsletter and announcements in
lectures. Due to space limitations, two sessions were held to collect answers,
totaling 109 subjects; in each session, subjects were informed that once all answers
are collected, three questions would be selected randomly, and for them urns A and
B would be reconstructed9 in front of the audience in a special prize-drawing
session. Based on the actual draws and subjects’ choices in the relevant questions,
the participant with the highest number of correct guesses in these three questions
would receive the main prize (RUR 3000, about 70% of the official minimum
monthly wage at that time), and the runner-up would receive the second prize (RUR
2000); any ties are resolved by randomization between participants with the highest
number of guesses. The competition between the winner and the runner up is not a
problem as it still creates incentives to provide the highest number of right guesses.
Experiment Lab2 took place at the ESSEXLab of the University of Essex (UK).
The ESSEXLab maintains a database of students and staff who have pre-registered
for participation in computerized lab experiments. Emails are sent to randomly
selected subjects from this database to recruit subjects. The experiment was
programmed with z-Tree.10 After all answers are collected, the software emulates
urns A and B by randomizing outcomes: the probability of drawing Red is set at 0.5
both for urn B (risky) in all questions and for urn A (ambiguous) in questions Q1-
Q4; at 0.6 for urn A in questions Q5 and Q7; and at 0.8 for urn A in question Q6. The
distributions for A were not communicated to the subjects, who were rather told
explicitly the following: ‘‘…disregard information from previous questions and
focus only on the information given in the particular question you are answering.
You can assume that this information is a correct description of the situation. It is
8 ‘‘Definition of Youth’’, United Nations fact sheet, https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/
fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf.
9 Identical machine-wrapped in blue and red foil chocolates were used as balls; non-transparent bags
were used as urns. All chocolates were distributed in the audience after the experiment as a participation
reward. Distribution of chocolates in Urn A was determined in front of the audience by the following
mechanism: subjects submitted numbers 1 to 9, not knowing what would happen afterwards, then the
fraction of subjects who submitted numbers 5..9 was calculated, multiplied by 100, and this value was
taken as the number of red balls in urn A. Further details are in Vinogradov and Shadrina (2013).
10 The software license requires that we mention the use of it in our experiment and cite Fischbacher
(2007).
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NOT used to misguide you.’’ Subjects receive £2 for each question where their
answer matches the computer-modelled draw. A minimum payoff of £5 was
guaranteed to participants; the average payoff was £17.
In all online experiments, subjects were recruited by snowball sampling, with an
initial invitation sent by email within the professional network of the experimenters,
as well as posted on social networks with a request to re-post. In experiment Web1,
a prize (£100 cheque) was promised to the participant with the highest number of
answers that match computer-generated draws; ties resolved by a random allocation,
as in experiment Lab1. Subjects had an option to provide their email address to be
contacted if they win; about two-thirds of them did. Other online experiments had
no monetary incentives. We controlled for intrinsic non-monetary motivation
(Vinogradov and Shadrina 2013) by dropping observations from incomplete
questionnaires. Adding experiments with no monetary incentives allows us to
control for the effect of the random assignment of the prize on decisions in
ambiguity—effectively, the randomization device embedded in such an incentive
scheme, forms a compound lottery together with the tasks subjects face in the
experiment. Theoretically, this may distort subjects’ choices. Having experiments
with no monetary incentives removes this distortion.
2.3 Analysis
Each subject performs a series of tasks under different information conditions,
which we call treatments. A question from the original Ellsberg task will be chosen
as a basis treatment (control). Our objective is to measure the effect of a change in
the information condition on subjects’ choices. Denote subject i’s choice in
treatment j ¼ 1::J as Ti;j 2 A;Bf g. One observation is a response of one subject in
one treatment (control).11 Each observation can be assigned a num-
bern ¼ J  i 1ð Þ þ j, establishing a one-to-one correspondence between subject-
treatment tuples and observations. For each observation of subjecti, we define J
values of the response variable as follows:
Knowing the values of control variables xi for each subjecti, we similarly define
for each observation n the subject-specific control variable xn as xJ: i1ð Þþj ¼ xi for
eachj ¼ 1::J. The same procedure is applied to ambiguity aversion AAn .
Finally, we define J signal-specific indicators sj (with j ¼ 1::J) with the following
values for each observation n:
With this notation, each observation n ¼ J  i 1ð Þ þ j consists of the response
Rn of subject i to signal j (treatment j), subject i’s ambiguity aversion AAn ¼ AAi,
other subject-specific factors xn and a treatment indicator sj;n, which takes a value of
1 if observation n corresponds to treatment j. It follows that the number of
observations entering each particular regression estimate equals the number of
subjects’ responses times the number of signals used in that regression. This equips
us with a tool to estimate the impact of signals, ambiguity aversion and behavioral
factors on the response variable Rn. All variables are binary. All estimates will be
11 For methodological aspects of the within-subject design see, e.g. Charness et al. (2012).
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obtained from probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level,
controlling for experiment-specific fixed effects.
It only remains to define the control condition. The Ellsberg task is the one with
the least information on the ambiguous urn, and lends itself as a control, however it
contains two questions (color conditions). Conveniently, ambiguity-averse subjects,
the way we classify them, choose only the risky urn (B) in both questions (similarly,
ambiguity-seeking subjects choose the ambiguous urn A in both questions).
Ambiguity-neutral subjects are expected to randomize 50–50 between A and B, yet
in our data 66.2% of ambiguity-neutral subjects chose the urn with the unknown
distribution, A, in the first question, when asked to bet on Red, and 33.8% chose it in
the second question, betting on Blue. This suggests either a color bias (subjects
believe they are luckier when they bet on Red than on Blue), or the question order
bias (subjects choose option A first as it comes first on the screen when reading from
top to bottom and from left to the right, and then they choose their answer to the
second question, so as to make it consistent with the first one, in line with
ambiguity-neutrality; as the question with betting on Red comes first, it attracts
more choices). All subsequent treatments, however, clearly specify that the prize
would only be awarded for drawing Red, and come as a single question for each
signal. The color bias can be ruled out as when asked about Red only, especially in
questions Q3 and Q4, the fraction of ambiguity-neutral subjects choosing A
becomes comparable to that in the Ellsberg task conditioned on Blue. Also note the
counter-intuitive effect: although Q1 and Q3-Q7 participants bet on red only, AN
subjects are less likely to choose the ambiguous urn A when they receive favorable
information than when they don’t. This also points towards possible order bias. To
correct for the order bias, we choose the second question from the Ellsberg task as
the control condition and denote it as sctrl. This approach provides a conservative
estimate of differences between ambiguity-averse and -neutral subjects, as it makes
the two groups closer to each other in their initial choices. As a robustness test, we
will use two alternative specifications for the control condition. First, we will
demonstrate how main results hold if the first (‘‘Red’’) Ellsberg question is chosen
for control. Second, we will designate Q3 (‘‘12 other participants prefer urn A’’) as
an alternative control condition. Moreover, we will redefine the control condition
again, when comparing choices across ‘‘probabilistic’’ signals. This will allow us to
contrast effects of signals in the ambiguity domain, i.e. compared to the original
choices in conditions of high ambiguity, versus those in the probability domain, i.e.
focusing on differences generated by signals that communicate probabilities.
In order to make notation more self-explanatory we denote signals as s12pref for
question Q3 (‘‘12 other subjects prefer urn A’’), s12=20pref for question Q4 (‘‘12 out of
20 subjects prefer urn A’’), and will use the communicated ratios of successes in A
as subscripts in s12=20, s16=20 and s120=200 for questions Q5–Q7. This corresponds to sj
used earlier.
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3 Results
We first present results for the effects of signals on subjects’ choices as compared to
the original Ellsberg task, which we call the ‘‘total effect’’. Then we study
‘‘marginal effects’’ of signals, i.e. changes in choices between different treatments,
with the main focus on the probability domain. We further proceed with an analysis
of behavioral factors that affect decisions.
3.1 Total effects
A strictly positive and significant fraction of ambiguity-averse subjects choose the
ambiguous prospect after signals s12pref and s12=20pref (recall, all ambiguity-averse
subjects, by our classification, choose B in the control treatment), although these
signals do not explicitly hint towards any particular value of the probability of
success in A. The non-probabilistic nature of these signals is confirmed by no
significant change in choices of ambiguity-neutral subjects, see differences s12pref 
sctrl and s12=20pref  sctrl in Table 2. The magnitude of changes in the fractions of
ambiguity-averse and -neutral subjects looks similar, yet note that initially a large
fraction of ambiguity-neutral subjects chose A, while zero ambiguity-averse subjects
did, this explains the difference in significance. When, however, a signal hints
towards a particular value of probability of success, both ambiguity-averse and
ambiguity-neutral subjects react to such news, even though the news is still vague.
In all treatments, more ambiguity-neutral subjects choose A, in line with our
expectations. Differences in means in Table 2 demonstrate a stronger response of
ambiguity-averse, than ambiguity-neutral subjects to probabilistic signals s12=20 ,
s16=20 and s120=200; as expected, we observe that choices of ambiguity-averse
subjects converge to those of ambiguity-neutrals and that probabilistic signals affect
decisions of ambiguity-neutral subjects to a lesser degree than those of ambiguity-
averse. Note also that the weak response of ambiguity-neutral subjects to signals
also manifests in the fact that in no treatment we have any more than 60% of them
choosing the ambiguous urn, A.
Importantly, the difference between the effects of the two non-probabilistic
signals,s12=20pref  s12pref , is also significant for ambiguity-averse subjects although
it is rather small, while it remains insignificant for ambiguity-neutrals. Even a small
change in the formulation of the message, that makes it look somewhat more
plausible, affects behavior of ambiguity-averse participants. Generally, comparison
of signals s12=20pref  s120=200 with signal s12pref instead of sctrl yields very similar
results to the above, confirming our findings are not biased by the choice of the
control condition. Remarkably though, this comparison for ambiguity-neutral
subjects reveals little change generated by signals s12=20 ands120=200, indicating the
communicated probability of success is not high enough to generate a significant
change in choices. Yet note that here the results are also internally consistent:
ambiguity-neutral subjects equally respond to signals with different precision but
the same probability, even when the basis for comparison is changed (s12pref instead
of sctrl).
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This simple analysis of differences does not account for heterogeneity of
subjects. To address this, we estimate the impact of signals on subjects’ choices,
controlling for subject-specific parameters, see Table 3.12 Signal notation is now
used to refer both to regressions constructed for the corresponding treatments and to
the dummies used in those regressions. Each regression contrasts the relevant
treatment with a control conditionsctrl; hence each dummy takes a value of 0 if the
relevant observation comes from the control condition. All signals appear to
significantly affect choices. The weakest, albeit still significant impact comes
Table 2 Signals and choices
Ambiguity-neutral
AN
Ambiguity-averse
AA
Difference AN –
AA
% of subjects choosing A in treatments:
Control 1: Ellsberg (Red) 62.63 0 62.63***
Control 2: Ellsberg (Blue) 37.37 0 37.37***
s12pref : 12 prefer A 41.67 6.47 35.19***
s12=20pref : 12 out of 20 prefer A 39.71 8.31 31.40***
s12=20: 12 out of 20 drew Red from A 46.08 33.52 12.55***
s16=20: 16 out of 20 drew Red from A 57.84 50.53 7.31***
s120=200: 120 out of 200 drew Red from
A
44.11 41.84 2.28
Marginal effects relative to s12pref
s12=20pref–s12pref - 1.96 1.84*** - 3.80***
s12=20–s12pref 4.41** 27.05*** - 22.64***
s16=20–s12pref 16.18*** 44.06*** - 27.88***
s120=200–s12pref 2.45 35.36*** - 32.91***
Marginal effects relative to s12=20pref
s12=20–s12=20pref 6.37*** 25.22*** - 18.84***
s16=20–s12=20pref 18.14*** 42.22*** - 24.08***
s120=200–s12=20pref 4.41** 33.53*** - 29.11***
Marginal effects relative to s12=20
s16=20—s12=20 11.76*** 17.00*** - 5.24***
s120=200—s12=20 - 1.96 8.31*** - 10.27***
Marginal effects relative to s16=20
s120=200—s16=20 - 13.72*** - 8.70*** - 5.03***
T-test for differences in means; ***p\ :01, ** p\ :05, * p\ :1. Results are qualitatively identical
assuming unequal variances for t-tests and using test for equality of proportions based on z-statistics.
Results based on all valid ambiguity-neutral and ambiguity-averse responses, total 1239
12 Note that as discussed in Sect. ‘‘Analysis’’, the number of observations equals the number of subjects’
responses times the number of signals used. In Tables 3,4,5,6,7,8 in each regression we use 2 signals – the
treatment sj and the control condition, for which reason the number of observations is the double of the
number of responses.
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through s12pref and s12=20pref , which are least informative by design. Signaling a
better probability (as in s16=20) has the strongest impact on subjects. To compare the
relative strength of the impact, note that coefficients for s12pref and s12=20pref are not
statistically different, while s12=20, s16=20 and s120=200 significantly differ from them
and between each other (Wald test, p\0:01 for all pairs). In all treatments,
ambiguity-averse subjects are less likely to choose A. Good understanding of
mathematical statistics makes subjects more likely to respond to probabilistic
signals s12=20 –s120=200. The role of gender is not consistently visible although there
is a weak tendency for female subjects to more frequently choose A.
In Table 3, ambiguity attitude has a universal effect on subjects’ choices across
treatments: being ambiguity-averse makes subjects less likely to choose A, as
expected. The question is. However. whether they are also more or less likely to
respond to signals than ambiguity-neutral subjects. To investigate, we include the
interaction term between ambiguity aversion, AA, and signal dummies, using the
Table 3 Impact of signals and ambiguity-aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
s12pref s12=20pref s12=20 s16=20 s120=200
AA - 0.182 - 0.172 - 0.197 - 0.196 - 0.173
( - 18.34)*** ( - 16.50)*** ( - 11.25)*** ( - 9.50)*** ( - 9.11)***
STAT - 0.009 - 0.009 0.041 0.047 0.061
( - 0.84) ( - 0.82) (2.81)*** (3.04)*** (4.01)***
Young 0.017 0.018 0.005 0.020 0.033
(1.34) (1.31) (0.30) (1.07) (1.85)*
Female 0.014 0.030 0.020 0.032 0.001
(1.37) (2.70)*** (1.39) (2.04)** (0.10)
s12pref 0.080
(8.23)***
s12=20pref 0.089
(8.99)***
s12=20 0.312
(20.35)***
s16=20 0.431
(26.63)***
s120=200 0.364
(22.55)***
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378 2378
Responses 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189
The dependent variable is dummy equal to 1 if subject chose A in the relevant treatment. Probit estimates.
Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported. Observations are counted at
subject-signal level, see Sect. ‘‘Anaysis’’ for details. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level.
Z-statistics in parentheses. ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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same controls as above. The signal terms without interaction reflect the impact of
signals on decisions through updating of the prior, while the interaction term
captures the ambiguity premium effect on ambiguity-averse subjects. Results in
Table 4 confirm the first two signals affect subjects’ decisions through ambiguity
Table 4 Impact of signals and ambiguity-aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
s12pref s12=20pref s12=20 s16=20 s120=200
AA - 0.604 - 0.646 - 1.176 - 1.252 - 1.235
( - 53.75)*** ( - 53.42)*** ( - 47.08)*** ( - 49.16)*** ( - 51.66)***
STAT - 0.009 - 0.009 0.045 0.050 0.066
( - 0.87) ( - 0.83) (2.85)*** (3.05)*** (4.09)***
Young 0.017 0.018 0.004 0.020 0.034
(1.31) (1.28) (0.24) (1.04) (1.80)*
Female 0.015 0.032 0.022 0.033 0.001
(1.36) (2.75)*** (1.38) (2.02)** (0.06)
s12pref 0.028
(1.81)*
s12pref  AA 0.459
(26.43)***
s12=20pref 0.019
(1.13)
s12=20pref  AA 0.524
(27.82)***
s12=20 0.078
(2.66)***
s12=20  AA 1.113
(32.56)***
s16=20 0.152
(5.09)***
s16=20  AA 1.214
(34.91)***
s120=200 0.069
(2.30)**
s120=200  AA 1.226
(37.00)***
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378 2378
Responses 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189
Note: The dependent variable is dummy equal to 1 if subject chose A in the relevant treatment. Probit
estimates. Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported. Observations are
counted at subject-signal level, see Sect. ‘‘Analysis’’ for details. Robust standard errors clustered at
participant level. Z-statistics in parentheses. ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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premiums solely, while signals s12=20—s120=200 work by updating the probability of
success. Ambiguity-averse subjects are more affected by probabilistic signals: all
interaction coefficients are positive, working against the separate effect of
ambiguity aversion, yet the response is stronger to probabilistic signals (e.g.
coefficients for s12=20pref  AA and s12=20  AA are different at p\0:01, Wald test).
Although all interaction terms are positive and significant, they counteract the
separate effect of AA, so that responses of ambiguity-averse subjects to probabilistic
signals are more aligned with those of ambiguity-neutrals, consistent with Table 3.
3.2 Robustness
First, we re-define sctrl so that it corresponds to the first question in the Ellsberg task
(recall that in the above exercise we used the second question from the Ellsberg task
as a control condition). As in Table 4, we measure effects of all signals on subjects’
choices as compared to this benchmark. Results in Table 5 confirm main findings
(see coefficients for AA and the interaction terms), except that we observe now a
significant negative effect of signals on choices, which we attribute to the order bias,
discussed in Sect. ‘‘Analysis’’: ambiguity-neutral subjects, counter-intuitively,
become less likely to choose A after they receive signals, for which reason the
difference between their response to signals and that of their ambiguity-averse peers
becomes even larger than in Table 4, see the interaction terms.
Second, we re-define the control condition again, by taking s12pref to be the new
sctrl. By design, s12pref is the least informative of all signals. We re-estimate the same
model as in Table 4. This gives us a more conservative estimate, as some ambiguity-
averse subjects have already responded to signal s12pref . Still effects of further
signals are sizeable; the estimates confirm main findings, see Table 6. Note that,
consistent with Table 2, results demonstrate the communicated probability in s12=20
and s120=200 is not high enough to generate any significant change in the behavior of
ambiguity-neutral subjects, this time also controlled for their gender, age, and
knowledge of statistics. The equality of coefficients also demonstrates ambiguity-
averse subjects equally [non-] respond to these two signals. Yet the significant
interaction terms confirm stronger response of ambiguity-averse subjects, both to
these two signals and to s16=20.
So far, we have ignored the ambiguity-seeking cohort – mainly because the usual
focus is on ambiguity-aversion, and the fraction of ambiguity-seeking subjects is
typically small. All theoretical considerations apply to ambiguity-seeking subjects
with an opposite sign, which would imply, in particular, that in all signals more of them
chooseA, yet that reduction in ambiguity would make less ambiguity-seeking subjects
choose A. If their confidence differs from the ambiguity-neutral cohort, there may also
be difference in updating. Results in Table 7 are in line with this interpretation.
Finally, we turn to the ability of subjects to understand the probabilistic nature of
the information we mean to communicate with our signals. This has been the key
element in our construct as we aimed to affect the prior subjects have. We use their
self-assessed proficiency in statistics to divide the sample into two groups–those
with high proficiency in statistics (STATS[ 3), and those who report they are not
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very familiar with probabilities and statistics (STATS = 3 and below). The
expectation is that subjects with a higher proficiency in statistics would be able to
recognize that the signals communicate the probability of success and thus the role
of these signals for them is more pronounced than for those with little understanding
Table 5 Impact of signals and ambiguity aversion on choices (alternative control condition)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
s12pref s12=20pref s12=20 s16=20 s120=200
AA - 0.690 - 0.749 - 1.296 - 1.448 - 1.437
( - 57.15)*** ( - 59.80)*** ( - 61.15)*** ( - 67.58)*** ( - 68.63)***
STAT 0.001 0.002 0.056 0.062 0.078
(0.10) (0.14) (3.59)*** (3.80)*** (4.86)***
Young 0.010 0.011 - 0.002 0.013 0.027
(0.79) (0.88) ( - 0.13) (0.72) (1.41)
Female 0.009 0.027 0.016 0.028 - 0.004
(0.85) (2.35)** (1.05) (1.74)* ( - 0.26)
s12pref - 0.068
( - 4.82)***
s12pref  AA 0.542
(32.80)***
s12=20pref - 0.085
( - 5.38)***
s12=20pref  AA 0.623
(33.75)***
s12=20 - 0.103
( - 3.86)***
s12=20  AA 1.228
(42.43)***
s16=20 - 0.040
( - 1.33)
s16=20  AA 1.405
(44.51)***
s120=200 - 0.120
( - 4.20)***
s120=200  AA 1.423
(47.34)***
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378 2378
Responses 1189 1189 1189 1189 1189
The dependent variable is dummy equal to 1 if subject chose A in the relevant treatment. Probit estimates.
Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported. Observations are counted at
subject-signal level, see Sect. ‘‘Analysis’’ for details. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level.
Z-statistics in parentheses. ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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of statistics. Table 8 confirms this conjecture – only the signal that communicates
the highest probability of success,s16=20, significantly affects choices of the cohort
with less familiarity with statistics. Unlike them, ‘‘statisticians’’ respond to all
probabilistic signals. Moreover, notable is that the coefficients for the interaction
terms are greater in the low-STATS cohort, which indicates ambiguity-averse
subjects in this cohort recognize a reduction in ambiguity and respond to it, even
though ambiguity-neutral subjects on average do not change their choices.
Table 6 Impact of signals and ambiguity-aversion on choices (control condition proxied by s12pref )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
s12=20pref s12=20 s16=20 s120=200
AA - 0.218 - 0.341 - 0.360 - 0.359
( - 10.75)*** ( - 11.14)*** ( - 11.20)*** ( - 11.30)***
STAT - 0.005 0.045 0.050 0.065
( - 0.35) (2.53)** (2.78)*** (3.59)***
Young 0.030 0.017 0.033 0.045
(1.57) (0.79) (1.55) (2.12)**
Female 0.039 0.031 0.042 0.012
(2.48)** (1.67)* (2.28)** (0.64)
s12=20pref - 0.017
( - 0.93)
s12=20pref  AA 0.040
(1.85)*
s12=20 0.031
(0.99)
s12=20  AA 0.264
(7.22)***
s16=20 0.119
(3.47)***
s16=20  AA 0.314
(7.97)***
s120=200 0.018
(0.57)
s120=200  AA 0.350
(9.51)***
Observations 2378 2378 2378 2378
Responses 1189 1189 1189 1189
The dependent variable is dummy equal to 1 if subject chose A in the relevant treatment. Probit estimates.
Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported. Observations are counted at
subject-signal level, see Sect. ‘‘Analysis’’ for details. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level.
Z-statistics in parentheses. ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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3.3 Individual experiments
Above, we pooled data from several experiments, controlling for experiment-
specific fixed effects. Table 9 presents main results for individual experiments, as
Table 7 Impact of signals and ambiguity-seeking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
s12pref s12=20pref s12=20 s16=20 s120=200
AS 1.483 1.488 1.480 1.469 1.443
(54.89)*** (57.66)*** (57.77)*** (55.69)*** (54.62)***
STAT - 0.020 0.004 0.046 0.063 0.044
( - 0.88) (0.16) (1.96)* (2.66)*** (1.89)*
Young 0.029 0.026 0.034 0.014 0.046
(1.06) (0.90) (1.25) (0.51) (1.77)*
Female 0.008 0.035 - 0.023 0.004 0.001
(0.35) (1.50) ( - 1.02) (0.17) (0.04)
s12pref 0.060
(1.81)*
s12pref  AS - 1.344
( - 35.45)***
s12=20pref 0.038
(1.15)
s12=20pref  AS - 1.341
( - 36.26)***
s12=20 0.089
(2.69)***
s12=20  AS - 1.370
( - 35.76)***
s16=20 0.161
(5.10)***
s16=20  AS - 1.419
( - 38.44)***
s120=200 0.073
(2.32)**
s120=200  AS - 1.285
( - 34.25)***
Observations 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232
Responses 616 616 616 616 616
The dependent variable is dummy equal to 1 if subject chose A in the relevant treatment. Probit estimates.
Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported. Observations are counted at
subject-signal level, see Sect. ‘‘Analysis’’ for details. Robust standard errors clustered at participant level.
Z-statistics in parentheses. ***p\ 0.01, **p\ 0.05, *p\ 0.1
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well as for incentivized versus non-incentivized, and online versus lab-based
experiments.13 All main results hold: ambiguity-aversion is robustly associated with
a stronger reaction to all signals, ambiguity-neutral subjects robustly react to s16=20;
in experiment Web1 they also equally react to s12=20 and s120=200, while in all other
experiments, except for Lab1, we are unable to detect any significant response of
them to these two signals. The only exception here is Lab1, where ambiguity-neutral
subjects seem to react to s120=200 but not to s12=20. This may be due to insufficient
incentives and subsequently randomizing behavior of otherwise ambiguity-averse
subjects, see discussion in Appendix A.
All control variables also demonstrate consistent effects in individual experi-
ments, except for gender: female subjects are more likely to choose A in online
experiments, while less likely to do so in the lab setting (although the latter effect is
insignificant, most likely due to the low number of observations). Potentially this
can be associated with different impacts of online (typically accessed from home, at
convenient time, relaxed and comfortable) and lab (formal, scheduled, less
comfortable) environments on female and male subjects. In our study gender is a
control variable, and this finding does not affect our main results, yet raises a note of
caution for experimental investigations of gender gaps in decisions, as results may
be environment sensitive.
4 Discussion
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, subjects crudely classified as
ambiguity-averse by the Ellsberg test, are persistently less likely (than their
ambiguity-neutral peers) to choose the ambiguous prospect in all treatments.
Second, not all ambiguity-neutral subjects respond to signals: even for the highest
probability signal in our setting, the one that is designed to communicate 80%
probability of success, we only obtain just about 58% ambiguity-neutral subjects
preferring urn A (ambiguous).
One can explain this result by assuming the ambiguity-neutral group is
heterogeneous and differs from the ambiguity-averse cohort in terms of levels of
confidence.14 More confident subjects are less likely to respond to signals as the
latter do not provide enough evidence to reject the prior, given the confidence level.
13 Here in each regression we use 6 signals – five treatments sj and one control condition, hence the
number of observations equals the number of responses times six.
14 An alternative explanation would be that some ambiguity-neutral subjects update beliefs pessimisti-
cally, and thus become effectively ambiguity-averse after a signal (see Eichberger et al. 2010). We thank
an anonymous reviewer for pointing at this possibility. Our data cannot reject such a scenario, as we
assume ambiguity attitudes fixed and only measure them once – through the standard Ellsberg task in the
beginning of each experiment. The explanation we offer allows for constant ambiguity attitudes, which is
particularly appealing and has certain similarity with the role confidence plays in the generalized
Bayesian updating rule in Eichberger et al.(2010), for which they demonstrate ambiguity attitudes remain
unaffected by updating. In particular, Eichberger et al. (2010) write ‘‘The less likely it was for the
conditioning event to arise under her ‘‘additive belief’’ p, the less confidence the individual attaches to the
additive component of the updated neo-additive capacity’’. The intuition is similar to ours: using the
probabilistic prior, decision-makers assess the likelihood of the observed event, and based on that decide
to which extent they trust the prior. If the observed event suggests the prior is not reliable then it gets
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If ambiguity-averse subjects are less confident, it comes as little surprise that they
react stronger to positive news about ‘‘the fundamentals’’ (the probability of
success). Ambiguity-averse subjects also respond to news that bear little informa-
tion about the fundamentals; the effect appears to be through a perceived reduction
in ambiguity.15 Although it is conceivable that subjects update their probabilistic
priors based on the reported behavior of other subjects (e.g. if they believe that
others possess information that they do not, which is quite plausible if no
information is available), the non-response of ambiguity-neutral decision-makers
rules this possibility out. The reaction of ambiguity-averse subjects to these
questions (s12pref and s12=20pref) may already be seen as their lower confidence than
that of their ambiguity-neutral counterparts. We now seek further evidence of
heterogeneity in confidence and its correlation with ambiguity attitudes.
In the post-experiment survey we asked subjects: ‘‘If you pick the wrong color
you can return the ball to the urn and instead pick again. Will you pick again from
the same urn?’’ (Q8). Answers to this question provide us with some measure of
subjects’ confidence, taking values of 1 (‘‘I will pick from the same urn’’) for higher
confidence and 0 (‘‘I will pick from a different urn’’) for lower confidence. Figure 2
compares the average confidence of cohorts of subjects who choose A after each of
our signals. The average confidence of the ambiguity-neutral subsample remains
roughly unchanged at the level of 69–74%; differences are not significant. For
ambiguity-averse subjects our measure is insignificantly lower at 68–69% for
‘‘uninformative’’ signals s12pref—s12=20pref and jumps to about 80% for s12=20—
s120=200 (difference from ambiguity-neutrals and from ‘‘uninformative’’ signals
statistically significant at p[ 0.05) suggesting a sub-cohort with higher confidence
responds to more informative signals, as we assumed in the description of the
information processing stage.
While we interpret the above measure as confidence, it has some drawbacks.
First, it is binary and does not give a clear picture of difference in confidence
between subjects who choose A in uninformative and informative questions.
Second, it is noisy: an ambiguity-neutral subject with a prior of 0.5 might want to
switch from one urn to another, independent of confidence. Unlike confidence-
driven change in choices, this switching is random due to indifference. While
ambiguity-neutrals with other priors should not switch unless they are not confident
in their priors, the presence of ‘‘random switchers’’ creates noise and may lead to an
underestimation of confidence in the ambiguity-neutral cohort. We, therefore, turn
to a different approach to assess confidence of our respondents.
In the Lab 2 experiment we asked post-experiment questions of the type ‘‘In
question 5 you were asked ‘‘12 people out of 20 picked a red ball from urn A. Which
urn would you prefer now?’’—did you have any particular number of red balls in
mind when making the choice?’’ Subjects could choose ranges n; nþ l½  between
n 0 and nþ l 100, and were advised to choose ‘‘from 0 to 100’’ if they did not
Footnote 14 continued
updated towards the value dictated by ambiguity attitudes, otherwise the probabilistic prior receives a
higher weight, and pessimism/optimism matter less.
15 This effect holds both for ambiguity-aversion and ambiguity-seeking.
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have any particular number of balls in mind; if they thought the number of red balls
was n, they were to indicate n; n½  . The lengths of the intervals, l, may be seen as a
subjective perception of ambiguity that surrounds decisions. Yet ambiguity in each
question is exogenous and identical for all subjects. The differences in perceptions
therefore can be seen as reflecting subjects’ confidence in their choices.16 We take
the value 100 – l to measure their confidence: subjects who report shorter ranges are
seen as more confident in their prior. Averages for this measure per signal are in
Fig. 3: results mimic the above assessment made through the crude binary measure
of confidence. Generally, improvement in the information content of the signal
makes more subjects with higher confidence choose A. Ambiguity-neutral subjects
on average demonstrate higher confidence, which explains why many of them do
not respond to informative though vague signals.17
Fig. 2 Average confidence of ambiguity-neutral (AN) and ambiguity-averse (AA) subjects choosing A in
each of the signals. Confidence is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject answers ‘‘I would draw from the same
urn’’ when asked ‘‘If you are given a second chance, would you draw from the same urn or from the other
urn?’’
16 Confidence is the interpretation Epstein and Schneider (2007) give to the set of priors.
17 Perhaps a better and more straightforward measure of confidence would be to ask ‘‘How confident are
you in this answer?’’, as in Lamla and Vinogradov (2019), whose dataset contains this confidence
information for individual inflation expectations and, separately, ambiguity attitudes measures for each
subject. Preliminary estimates using this data confirm our above result that confidence (measured through
answers to this question) also appears to be higher among ambiguity-neutral subjects.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented results of an Ellsberg-type experiment with imprecise signals
about the probability of success in the ambiguous urn. Our signals are verbal,
similar to messages often used in online stores. They vary in the level of ambiguity,
or communicated probability, or both. We conjecture that at the information
processing stage decision-makers assess whether their prior needs updating. This
assessment is part of the decision process of all subjects, independent of their
ambiguity attitudes. If confidence is high and the precision of the signal is low, the
prior belief may stay despite the news subjects receive. This approach explains, for
example, why ambiguity-neutral subjects may differently respond to signals of
different levels of ambiguity: vague signals will not reject the prior belief, and thus
have no impact on decisions, while signals with low ambiguity (high precision) will
lead to an updating of beliefs, and thus affect decisions. Ambiguity-neutrality is still
there, reflected in the zero ambiguity premium ambiguity-neutral subjects require
for dealing with ambiguity, even though the latter is recognized. However,
ambiguity attitudes appear correlated with confidence, which is the key factor
behind the assessment that leads or does not lead to updating of beliefs.
Empirically we find that ambiguity-neutral subjects indeed are less responsive to
vague news. Despite varying the communicated probability of success and the
precision, we were unable to obtain any more than 60% of them choosing the
ambiguous urn in the Ellsberg-type experiment. Responses of ambiguity-averse and
ambiguity-neutral cohorts to signals in our experiments indicate that ambiguity-
Fig. 3 Average confidence of ambiguity-neutral (AN) and ambiguity-averse (AA) subjects per signal in
UK lab experiment, measured as 100—l, where l is the length of the reported range within which subjects
thought the actual number of red balls in the ambiguous urn (A) would fall
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neutral subjects on average are more confident than ambiguity-averse, and it is this
lack of confidence that makes ambiguity-averse subjects to react to vague news.
Vagueness of news therefore has two effects on decisions: one is reflected in
‘‘pricing’’ of ambiguity (as reflected in the ambiguity premium), given some belief,
and the other—in the decision to update or not to update beliefs, which applies to all
subjects, regardless their ambiguity attitudes. The latter effect may also differentiate
between subjects with different ambiguity attitudes, if attitudes correlate with
confidence. Our observations, as well as some observations from other studies, point
towards such a correlation. More research is needed to better understand how
confidence and ambiguity attitudes relate to each other and to decisions people
make in uncertainty.
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Appendix A. Online versus lab experiments
A number of factors may potentially make results of lab experiments differ from
those obtained online. Fear of negative evaluation (FNE) by others is known to
affect attitudes to ambiguity (Curley et al. 1986). Although one can design
experiments to ensure preferences are not revealed to experimenters, thus avoiding
FNE in experimental tasks (Trautmann et al. 2008), it continues to affect incentives
in the lab: when the experiment becomes boring and the expected payoff does not
suffice to keep subjects motivated to continue (Rubinstein 2013), they might still do
so, to avoid possible negative evaluation by other participants and the experimenters
who would be able to observe subjects interrupting and leaving the lab. In addition,
it has become a norm to offer subjects a show-up fee in a lab. It enters the total
payoff together with an elaborate incentive scheme designed to reveal subjects’
preferences and beliefs. The scheme itself may be quite complicated; in particular,
with regards to lottery choices it involves a randomization device, which needs to be
explained to the subjects. Suspicion is a known problem: participants may believe
that experimenters manipulate the randomizing device in such a way as to minimize
the payoffs (see, e.g., Frisch and Baron 1988; Kühberger and Perner 2003;
123
D. Vinogradov, Y. Makhlouf
Dimmock et al. 2016a, for a discussion of the issue). Confusion about the payoff
structure and suspicion may reduce the effectiveness of incentives, especially given
the guaranteed show-up fee. Continuation despite the lack of incentives would result
in random choices. In our setting this is a particular problem, as subjects
randomizing between the two urns in the Ellsberg experiment are classified as
ambiguity-neutral. Online experiments rule this out as subjects can leave the
experiment at any moment; suspicion does not arise as all questions are hypothetical
and randomization takes place in the minds of participants; and no show-up fee
creates no incentives to continue despite lacking motivation.
Although evidence suggests online experiments are able to yield results similar to
those obtained in a lab (see e.g. Krantz and Dalal 2000), concerns may arise with
regards to data validity; Birnbaum (2004) discusses methodology issues related to
online surveys, Horton et al. (2011) summarize approaches that help validate the
data. Vinogradov and Shadrina (2013) argue that it is non-monetary intrinsic
motivation of subjects (such as curiosity and willingness to help) that matters for the
quality of data collected and its comparability with the lab. To control for this, in
line with their results, we omit all incomplete responses. We also remove multiple
submissions, i.e. all occasional duplicate entries as per the IP address.18 The web
platform19 uses cookies to detect if the survey was taken previously from the same
computer. To minimize the attrition effect, a large initial sample of responses was
acquired. A sampling bias may occur with snowballing, to minimize which, the
survey was introduced to subjects via different channels. Some authors suggest
participants may wish to cheat in online experiments, submitting answers they
believe experimenters would see as correct ones (Reips 2000). To prevent this, the
(preliminary) findings from the experiment and possible answers were not available
to participants while the experiment was running. We also find it useful that the
Ellsberg task does not impose a right or wrong answer thus removing incentives to
cheat. Having a series of experiments under different arrangements allows us to
reduce potential biases.
The clarity of questions was tested by trialling the experiments as face-to-face
surveys to obtain feedback and ensure our instructions were clear. We piloted the
experiment online in 2011 with 765 complete responses obtained via snowballing,
of which 68.4% were classified as ambiguity-averse and 11.2% as ambiguity-
neutral. Findings from this pilot are similar to what we report in the paper, yet due to
the lack of data on gender and age we did not include it in the sample used here.
Informal post-experiment feedback from the pilot, as well as from experiments
reported below, confirmed subjects correctly understood the tasks.
Generally, unincentivized surveys are not uncommon and data from them is
regarded reliable: for example, the Michigan Survey of Consumers is a major source
of inflation expectations data for the U.S. (e.g., Thomas 1999; Carroll 2003;
Dominitz and Manski 2004). Although subjects are usually paid a fee to complete
the [rather long] questionnaire, individual answers are not incentivized and payoff
18 Unfortunately, this also removes all subjects that use the same access point (e.g. wireless router) to
access internet.
19 Online experiments were run on www.surveymonkey.com.
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does not depend on the correctness of forecasts. McFadden et al. (2005) review
possible biases in surveys and suggest remedies, in particular they note that
hypothetical questions (‘‘vignette surveys’’) and abstract questions (like ‘‘On a scale
of 0 to 100, where 0 means no chance, and 100 means certainty, what would you say
is the probability of …?’’) yield answers highly predictive of actual subsequent
behavior. Hollard et al. (2016) demonstrate that a simple non-incentivized rule of
asking subjects about their subjective beliefs performs well in eliciting those beliefs,
compared to incentivized rules.
Appendix B. Questionnaire and instructions
The following questionnaire was used without major alterations in all experiments
reported in this paper. Minor alterations concerned the availability of the Indifferent
option, on top of the options to choose urn A or urn B in experiments Web1 and
Web2. This does not affect the classification of subjects as ambiguity-averse or
ambiguity-neutral, as all experiments included a version of questions Q1 and Q2
without the indifference option. In the analysis of choices this indifference option
might underestimate the fraction of subjects who choose A, thus providing us with a
conservative estimate for our results.
The questionnaire:
Consider two identical urns each of which has 100 balls colored red and blue.
One of the urns has an unknown number of balls of each color. The other one has
exactly 50 red and 50 blue balls.
Balls are returned to the urns after each draw.
Part I
Q1. If a red ball is drawn you will get the prize. Would you prefer to draw the ball
from Urn A or Urn B?
Q2. If a blue ball is drawn you will get the prize. Would you prefer to draw the
ball from Urn A or Urn B?
Part II
From now on you can get the prize only if the red ball is drawn.
Q3.12 people before you preferred urn A to urn B when asked to draw a red ball.
Which urn would you prefer now?
Q4.12 out of 20 people before you preferred urn A to urn B when asked to pick a
red ball. Which urn would you prefer now?
Q5.12 people out of 20 picked a red ball from urn A. Which urn would you prefer
now?
Q6.16 people out of 20 picked a red ball from urn A. Which urn would you prefer
now?
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Q7.120 out of 200 people picked a red ball from urn A. Which urn would you
prefer now?
Part III
Q8.If you pick the wrong color you can return the ball to the urn and instead pick
again. Will you pick again from the same urn?
Q9 8 out of 10 people who used their second chance before you, have changed
the urn to pick the ball. Would you prefer now the same urn for your second chance?
Part IV
Q10. Please rate your knowledge of probability and statistics on the scale of 1 to 5, 1
being unfamiliar with probability and statistics (basic knowledge or no knowledge)
and 5 being solid in these subjects (have taken a course on them, studied them
somewhere else etc.).
Q11. Sex (M = male, F = female)
Q12. Age (subjects choose on the following scale: below 25, 25 – 35, 36 – 45, 46
– 55, 56 – 65, above 65)
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
Experiment instructions (only used in lab experiments):
Welcome. This is an experiment on decision-making. If you read the following
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable
amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions
carefully.
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment.
If you have a question at any time raise your hand and the experimenter will come to
your desk to answer it. Please switch off your mobile phone or any other devices
which may disturb the experiment. Please use the computer only for entering your
decisions. Please only use the decision forms provided, do not start or end any
programs, and do not change any settings.
During the experiment you can earn ‘‘points’’. At the end of the experiment these
points will be converted to cash at the following rate:
1 point = £2
In this experiment we guarantee a minimum earning of £5. The maximum you
can earn in this experiment is £32. The experiment consists of three parts. In each of
them you will deal with two urns containing red and blue balls each. One urn (urn
B) has exactly 50 red balls and 50 blue balls in it. The other urn (urn A) has also 100
balls but the exact number of red and blue balls in it is unknown; you only know that
balls in it are either red or blue, there can be no balls of any other color.
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked to select either urn A or urn
B. The computer will draw a ball from your selected urn. If this ball is of the
designated color (red or blue, depending on the question), you will get the prize (1
point). If there is an option ‘‘indifferent’’ and you choose this option, the computer
will decide for you, from which urn the ball should be drawn. If you prefer to make
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the decision yourself, please select either urn A or urn B, not ‘‘indifferent’’. This
part contains four questions: two with indifference option and two without it.
In the second part you will be given more information. Each piece of information
refers to a new situation. In all situations, urn B contains 50 red balls and 50 blue
balls, as before. Please treat each question separately, disregard information from
previous questions and focus only on the information given in the particular
question you are answering. You can assume that this information is a correct
description of the situation. It is NOT used to misguide you. This part contains five
questions. In each of them you will get the prize (1 point) if the computer draws a
RED ball from your selected urn, and zero if the drawn ball is blue.
In the third part we will ask questions about yourself and the way you made your
decisions. Please provide accurate answers, you can earn extra points here. We
might also ask you to answer one of the previous questions again. Please treat this
question as a new one, you are not required to remember and reproduce your answer
to a similar question in the first or second part, just give an accurate answer as if you
didn’t answer this question before. This question concludes the experiment.
Once the experiment ends, you will be shown your choices, the colors of balls
drawn from the respective urns, and your earnings from the respective questions. All
extra earnings and the total payoff will be shown in a separate screen.
Thank you for your participation!
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